








Justice, Order and Anarchy: The International Political Theory of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865)*
Alex Prichard

‘As man seeks justice in equality, so society seeks order in anarchy.’​[1]​

‘Man’s belligerent nature is all that saves him from despotism.’​[2]​

Two changes during the 1990s fundamentally transformed the face of IR theory. The first was a distinctive return to political theory in IR,​[3]​ the second the development of Critical Theory – postmodern and otherwise.​[4]​ The first move sought to question the misleading caricatures of writers such as Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant that were used to justify an eternal (invariably Realist) wisdom of IR. This was accompanied by a more sophisticated historiography and sociology of the discipline​[5]​ that brought into question not only the autonomy of the ‘international’ but also IR itself.

Critical Theorists turned modern and postmodern political theory guns on the bastions of traditional IR theory. This included a trenchant critique of positivism; a critique of claims regarding the structural immutability and autonomy of the ‘international’; a critique of rump materialism on the right and class and production on the left; and a corresponding concern for the processes and boundaries of exclusion ignored while production, statism, an amoral positivism, and an ethic of ‘interests’ dominated thinking in IR theory.​[6]​

These critiques have moved IR theory’s research agenda towards discovering the motors of change and the principles of stasis within a deeper conception of both the international and the political in international relations, and in IR as a discipline. The result is a distinctive shift towards a historical and political sociology of IR and its subject matter.​[7]​ Such a shift is long overdue, and arguably the outcome of the rejection of the statist and rationalist project of the twentieth century and its catastrophic consequences for human life.

This paper will demonstrate that these conceptual moves are a surprising echo of those made by the anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) nearly 150 years ago, and for many of the same reasons.​[8]​ Proudhon questioned and reformulated the newly devised positivist sociology of Auguste Comte, the teleological and idealist Kantian philosophy of history, the nationalist statism of Rousseau, and their shared critique of Hobbes’s materialist egoism, the Jacobin communism of the likes of Louis Blanc and the liberal individualism of Ricardo and others. By standing fast to a commitment to individual and group autonomy, republican socialism, a sociological and moral ontology, anti-dogmatism in social theory and an openness in historical analysis, he broke decisively with each of these authors – in particular in relation to their statism – and by so doing devised anarchism as an alternative political paradigm. In the process, Proudhon formulated the first comprehensive break from the modernist paradigm that was to come to dominate social theory entirely within 50 years of his death.

His intellectual development culminated with the publication of his magnum opus, De la Justice dans la Révolution et dans l’Église (1858).​[9]​ Three years later he published La Guerre et la Paix (1861) which constituted the first two volumes of over 2000 pages of published and unpublished material that engaged directly with international relations as a distinct field of inquiry.​[10]​ Unlike his contemporaries, these were no mere appendages to his broader project, but a fundamental development of his thinking about the role of force and war in the historical constitution of social justice. In this regard, in the introduction to the most recent edition of Proudhon’s La Guerre et la Paix, Hervé Trinquer argues that it is ‘without doubt one of the most important sociological works ever published’.​[11]​ It has, of course, been almost completely ignored, and as Amouduz has argued, what actually transpired in the 100 years of world politics following its publication was the ‘inverse’ of what Proudhon had argued for.​[12]​

It should therefore come as no surprise that Proudhon was ignored or rejected by all bar one of the founding fathers of the discipline of IR, who correctly looked to Rousseau, Hobbes and Kant to find the progenitors of the era, and arguably mischaracterised their thought much as they did Proudhon’s. For example, Morgenthau argued that Proudhon ‘was among the first to glorify the blessings of science in the international field’.​[13]​ Given his disdain for behaviourism he ridiculed Proudhon as a misguided utopian and an important milestone in the pre-history of IR was subsequently lost. E. H. Carr, in a fit of propagandist rage, denounced Proudhon’s work on international politics as a ‘panegyric’ to war and the deranged ranting of a French ‘chauvinist’, and by so doing utterly, and no doubt intentionally, mischaracterised his work.​[14]​ Quincy Wright unthinkingly clumped Proudhon with Nietzsche and Sorel as a simple ‘glorifier of war’,​[15]​ while years later Daniel Pick portrayed him as an antagonistic and rather trivial apologist for slaughter.​[16]​ Only Raymond Aron, the eminent Sorbonne political sociologist and Realist IR theorist, has used Proudhon’s work on international politics sympathetically and in a substantive way, and does so in his writings on the ethics of war.​[17]​

Perhaps due to the unfair reputation his work has acquired, much of the extant secondary literature on Proudhon’s life and thought largely ignores his international politics. For example, and rather ironically from the perspective of a discipline that routinely does the opposite, Alan Ritter explicitly uses Proudhon’s international political theory to elucidate his political theory.​[18]​ Only Amoudruz has devoted an entire monograph to this aspect of his thought and yet she too fails to grasp the depth in Proudhon’s work, seeing him as a populist journalist with the good sense of the ‘petit paysanne’,​[19]​ but with none of the intellectual acumen of his more illustrious contemporaries. Noland’s important essay goes some way to redressing this by demonstrating, if rather unwittingly, the influence of Comte on Proudhon’s thinking.​[20]​ But overall the secondary literature on this aspect of his thinking is poor. In IR, despite numerous reappraisals of other pre-twentieth-century thinkers, it is practically non-existent.​[21]​

So, using the same methodological tools to mine the rich vein of ‘the political theory of international relations’ opened by the authors discussed at the outset, and by way of contribution to contemporary Critical Theory, this paper presents a re-evaluation of Proudhon’s international political theory and by so doing aims to bring his ideas in from the cold.​[22]​ I will contextualise it intellectually and historically, and in the conclusion I will suggest its historical and intellectual value for the contemporary study of world politics. In this way, I hope to present a more coherent and suggestive Proudhon than the one presented as myth in the vast majority of the secondary literature,​[23]​ and instil a little confidence in contemporary IR theorists that a turn to Proudhon’s ideas might help us understand both the origins of the twenty-first century, and ways of thinking beyond it.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first outlines Proudhon’s theory of justice as immanent equilibrium. Understanding this thematic context is crucial if we are to understand what is original and, indeed, what was typical in Proudhon’s understanding of war and peace. The second section turns to Proudhon’s conceptualisation of war and order. Developing his moral and sociological ontology of justice, I here discuss how Proudhon develops this into a full-blown humanist theory of war and peace that sees international law and order as emergent from social conflict. The third section revisits the concept of anarchy/anarchism to provide a then original, and yet now oddly contemporary conception of the justice/order/anarchy trinity in IR theory.


Justice as Immanent Equilibrium

French social theory in the first half of the nineteenth century was historical, sociological, and scientific. But above all else it was distinctively moral or normative. It was a commonly held position that humanity (invariably man) was capable of moral development and rational action, society consequently open to radical reconstruction, and that history provided proof of this. With the rise of positivism, it became common to argue for a scientific understanding of the role of morality and justice in constituting social order and a more prominent role for science (as opposed to religion or metaphysics) in advancing this understanding.

Following Charles Fourier, Proudhon argued that ‘justice is innate to our conscience’,​[24]​ a ‘pressure in our soul’, basically an instinct, a passion and the source of our individuality. Fourier argued that repressing our passions led to individual and social pathologies;​[25]​ for Proudhon, alienating our passions led to despotism. Pace Kant who believed the passions to be ‘“pathological” where duty was concerned’,​[26]​ Proudhon argued that history might usefully be seen as a process of rediscovering and recovering our alienated passionate moral autonomy from the clasp of first, religion and the strictures of dogma, and then classical metaphysics and the turn to dispassionate reason. The third stage in this manifestly Comtean ‘three stages’ thesis is the positive scientific age. Proudhon argued, as did the majority of his contemporaries, that with the collapse of religious certainties and the birth of scientific rationalism, human morality was now open to scientific analysis based on observation.

Proudhon argued that it is probably best to understand humans as both ‘angel and brute’, but that every individual has a conscience, and this conscience or instinct for justice is the primary source of all moral norms and social action. This says nothing of their ultimate goodness or badness, only that morality, and thus degree of passionate autonomy, is a physiological fact. For Rousseau, Kant and Comte this fact of human autonomy and the moral passions which animate it, was a problem which promised only anarchic consequences.​[27]​ Thus, for all four the purpose of their political theory was to find a form of association that would circumscribe rational egoism and our passions within a benign and stable political community.

Rousseau believed the state constructed according to the General Will provided such a solution, whereby individual autonomy is ultimately alienated to the Sovereign. The problem then became the actions of the sovereign in international relations. Kant, ‘straightening Rousseau out’, believed that by a teleological process of historical development man would inevitably find order through the full realisation of his reason – not his instinct – in a ‘perfectly just civil constitution’, the basis of which could be understood and considered binding because of the rational unfurling of human reason in history. Comte broadly agreed with Kant’s philosophy of history, actually deciding to make his own ‘more deterministic’ as a result, but argued that the only way to social ‘Harmony’ was to abrogate the average individual’s right to ‘critical’ thought altogether, and demand the alienation of our moral autonomy to the positivist ‘Priest Scientists’ who would direct society for us.​[28]​ Proudhon disagreed explicitly with all three and herein lies his originality. He argued thus:

Justice is not a commandment ordered by a superior authority to a lesser being, as the majority of authors who write on the rights of man teach; Justice is immanent to the human soul … [and] it constitutes its highest power and supreme dignity.​[29]​

This principle of ‘Immanence’ is a direct and explicit rejection of the Kantian notion of ‘Transcendence’, and the Ecclesiastical theory of ‘Revelation’ and it was central to Proudhon’s thinking. He even goes so far as to say that talking in terms of immanence makes one a ‘true anarchist’.​[30]​ For Proudhon justice emerges out of social conflict, conflict that is driven by our ideals, our passions and our needs, no less than by the internal conflict between our emotional and rational faculties. Explaining this theory is central to understanding Proudhon’s originality here.

For Proudhon morality operates through three principal processes. The individual is the primary source of justice; the communities and groups individuals build or join become the second layer of justice, are irreducible to the individuals comprising them, and have a moral autonomy which Proudhon derives from the reality of their ‘collective conscience’; and finally, the norms of these collectives or associations feed back on to individual rationalisations of justice, and both help and hinder the subsequent development of the moral capacity in humans and in society.​[31]​ We will see that this ideational process has a material corollary, but both are natural, historical process, and unsurprisingly Proudhon also has a vision of the state of nature to illustrate it:

According to … [my] theory, man, although he was originally in a completely savage state, constantly creates society through the spontaneous development of his nature. It is only in the abstract that he may be regarded as in a state of isolation, governed by no law other than self interest … Man is an integral part of collective existence and as such he is aware both of his own dignity and that of others. Thus he carries within himself the principles of a moral code that goes beyond the individual [i.e. social norms] … They are the characteristic mould of the human soul, daily refined and perfected through social relations.​[32]​

Our passions, respect and dignity are the key forces here, but they can be given meaning only within a social context. It is the ensuing and largely inevitable conflict engendered by our social natures that drives us to find equilibrium between competing positions, and because we are always already social, the point or nature of the equilibrium will vary according to the intellectual and material nature of the societies within which humans develop emotionally and rationally. Morality thus has a fundamentally historical and social ontology because humans (the source of morality) are fundamentally and inescapably social animals constituted by history. Much like contemporary Critical Theory, and for many of the same reasons, the primary objective of Proudhon’s magnum opus, De la Justice dans la Révolution et dans l’Église is to undermine the ahistorical dogmas of ‘necessity’ or ‘transcendence’ espoused by the Church, the statist a priori metaphysics of Hobbes, Kant and Rousseau, and the positivist scientism of Comte and the positivists. It is this process of intellectual development that changes our moral beliefs about the world and in turn creates the conflict that drives social change.​[33]​ It is clear that this micro-formulation has its natural corollary in international politics.


War and International Order

Proudhon argued that if we focus on the size of the latest guns, or the movements of armies on maps, we miss the most important aspect of war: its moral ‘phenomenology’. Following Kant and Comte, Proudhon saw war as a historical force with frequent, though not enough to justify its continuation, progressive moral and social consequences. But in order to avoid their statist conclusions, and the belligerence of his left-wing contemporaries, he had to rework their formulations on the basis of his understanding of the source of justice. This allowed him to understand international and domestic order by reference to a basic form of social psychology as well as to the material imperatives of our human social condition. Here I will demonstrate how Proudhon links the individual to international politics; how he sees psychology to be central to world politics and how his theory of war and order is fundamentally sociological.


Individual and Collective Antagonism

In a letter to his long-time friend Tissot, Kant’s principal French translator at that time, Proudhon stated that, ‘[i]n reading Kant’s antinomies, I saw in them, not a proof of the weakness of our reason, nor an example of dialectical subtlety, but a veritable law of nature and of thought’.​[34]​ Kant had argued that the antinomies of pure reason were in perpetual and irresolvable conflict and were a block to the fantasies of pure solipsism since they directed our mind to the empirical realm. Proudhon extended this formulation and nowhere is this more evident than in his understanding of international politics.

Here he argues that the antagonism Kant saw only in reason also operates through and between the fluid and irreducible layers of social life. The first layer of antagonism is, as with the fundamentals of his moral philosophy, the relationship within and between individuals. His humanism is striking here:

Real human virtue is not solely negative. It does not solely consist of abstaining from all things condemned by law and morality, it consists also – even more so – in acting with energy, talent and with will and character against the excesses of those personalities which by the sole fact of their existence tend to erase us.​[35]​

Abstention, virtue and restraint are as important as expression and action, and both restraint and action unavoidably lead to internal and social conflict. As he puts it: ‘[a]ction is therefore a struggle: to act is to combat’.​[36]​ In primitive societies (or Proudhon’s state of nature) this conflict is acutely exacerbated by the conflict between humanity and nature. The result is the need to associate into ‘natural groups’ for mutual protection, for creative or productive purposes, and also for destructive, defensive and domineering purposes against other associations and nature itself.

In his work on federalism Proudhon states that these ‘natural groups’ that emerge are any groups which ‘willy-nilly impose upon themselves some conditions of solidarity … which soon constitutes itself into a city or a political organism, affirms itself in its unity, its independence, its life or its own movement (autokinesis), and its autonomy’.​[37]​ These associations produce their own distinct forces, which emerge from forms of human interaction, cooperation, and conflict but are nevertheless irreducible to the individual. These ‘associations’ are also spontaneous in so far as they are responses to pre-existing social conditions and vary in size and purpose depending on the tasks they are designed to fulfil. ‘In short, just as individualism is the primordial factor in humanity, so association is its complementary term. Both are present constantly.’​[38]​ Proudhon said that he was ‘led to consider society as being as real a thing as the individuals who compose it, and then to see the collectivity or group as the condition for all [human] existence’.​[39]​ Noland sums it up like this:

In Proudhon’s view, … from the clash of singular, egoistical interests and wills – for conflict was inherent in the group as in society, in man and in nature – there is produced an entity which is a collective expression, something utterly unlike the individual elements themselves. The confluence of individual forces produces an entity ‘different in quality from the forces that compose it and superior to their sum’.​[40]​

By contrast, Manuel has argued that Comte’s ‘embryonic … version of Jung’s idea of collective consciousness had many eighteenth century roots’, but it was clear that for Comte ‘the individual found his true fulfilment only by subordinating his subjectivity. The impression is inescapable that in the positivist religion there is a total loss of personality as man is merged in the perfect transcendent unity of Humanity.’​[41]​ And to a degree this was as true for Rousseau and innumerable other nineteenth- and twentieth-century continental European thinkers.

But for Proudhon, as for Fourier and Kant whom he follows here, the individual is sacrosanct, an end in itself, though not because of the dictates of religion or reason, but because if the individual were not free and protected, if our passions and the resulting conflict and antagonism were not given free reign, history would effectively grind to a halt (which is undoubtedly what Comte sought). But by keeping the individual separate, valuing man’s moral autonomy above all else,​[42]​ and trying to think through its relation to society, which was itself no less in need of defending from the rationalist individualists, it seems Hall was wrong to disagree with Bouglé, and Proudhon was in fact ‘one of the first social thinkers to attempt the primitive synthesis of these levels of social reality’.​[43]​

Proudhon’s rationalisation of the social order in this way was based on new, positive understandings of the source and nature of morality and revolutionary ideas about human social and material agency, and Comtean and Fourierist psychology were central to it.​[44]​ Proudhon argued that material social orders are rationalised psychologically and it was widely accepted that the first such rationalisation is religion. Due to the prevalence of conflict, and given that personification was argued to be the primary mode of rationalisation in primitive societies, it was inevitable, Proudhon argued, that religious cosmology became fundamentally infused with militaristic metaphor. This explains why nearly all peoples considered a sizable proportion of their gods to be warriors. ‘[W]ho cannot see that war served as a primitive mould of theology …?’ Proudhon asks.​[45]​ It is a truism, and probably one worth repeating, that the ‘same [human] conscience that produces religion and justice also produces war; the same fervour, the same spontaneity of enthusiasm that animates the profits and the jurists sweeps along the heroes: it is this which constitutes the divine character of war’.​[46]​ Echoing the work of Feuerbach, for Proudhon the sociology of religion was a key entry point into the history of human psychology, demonstrating the epic ideals by which people organise their lives in response to material change and to animate and rationalise their battles and demands for justice. In short, people need something to fight for, and rarely, if ever, fight for nothing but this says nothing about whether they are right or wrong to do so.


Law and Constitutional Order

Proudhon argued that ‘[c]onquest, while it lays the ground for and circumscribes the state, creates the sovereign’.​[47]​ His intention was to show that war and force, not some metaphysical Social Contract, creates states, sovereigns and legal citizens, investing them with mythical qualities derived from the strongly idealised nature of war and society. But if conflict is all-pervasive and seems, by Proudhon’s formulation, to be central to just about everything, what provides for social order? For Proudhon it is the ‘right of force’, which ‘exists by tacit convention …; it is neither a concession nor a fiction … it is truly a right in every sense of the word’.​[48]​ It is also fundamentally moral since it is fundamentally human.

While Proudhon’s concept of force and its relation to right is too complex to explain sufficiently here,​[49]​ it is clear that for him material and ideational force is fundamental to all species of right, because without the individual and group struggle to enforce or destroy systems of justice, society would atrophy or result in the most total despotism. Submitting to force is no less a basis of political order, and we would only concede to it if we respected it as a right – at least tacitly. If we reject this right or force, we fight against it and the winner, the most powerful, is the new dominant force in society. Nevertheless,

The right of force is the most simple and most elementary [of all rights]: it is the homage rendered to man for his force. Like all other rights it exists only under the condition of reciprocity [and assuming] the right which belongs to the first does not destroy that of the other.​[50]​

The symmetry between this conception of the right of force and the almost Nietzschean understanding of interpersonal conflict outlined above are striking. However, even though Proudhon argues that force is historically, sociologically and analytically the first of all rights, it is nevertheless ‘the last in rank’.​[51]​ Since humans have evolved both morally and intellectually, our capacity to change our ways of rationalising and circumscribing this right of force has resulted in historically evolved forms of social equilibrium encapsulated in law and tradition but supported by force. Law thus represents the constitutional status quo between the antagonistic forces within and between societies. Proudhon argued that it is both social and collective forces that adjudicate and establish laws in ‘domestic’ society, and ‘internationally’ speaking, these same forces do exactly the same; what changes are the mediating institutions and the types of force used. The key force is clearly the military and police state, and war and social conflict are change’s motor. History’s direction thus resides with those who control the preponderance of material and ideational force.​[52]​

Looking at this process historically, war can be seen as a judgement of force, and its judgement is, and always has been, veridical – victors not only (re)write history, they also (re)write laws. If the vanquished disagree with the outcome of a conflict they fight against, and in so doing they appeal to the specific myths, norms and ideals of their societies to justify both declaring war and the particular way they chose to fight it. Simply put, for Proudhon ‘[t]he historical point of departure for all species of right is in war’.​[53]​ Furthermore, ‘[t]his genealogy, which conforms to the historical record, is the inverse of that generally assumed’.​[54]​ This may be overstating his case somewhat, but the argument, when expanded, seems convincing:

The right of force, the right of war and the rights of nations, defined and circumscribed as we have argued, by supporting, implicating, and engendering one another, govern history. They are the secret providence which directs nations, makes and unmakes states, and through the harmonising of force and law drives civilization through the surest and widest path. Through them are understood a mass of things which are impossible to understand by ordinary law, or by any historical system, or by the capricious machinations of chance.​[55]​

The echoes of Kant’s ‘Idea of a Universal History’ are striking here. However, Proudhon’s philosophical realism led him to see this movement as a reality as opposed to an ‘Idea’. He went on to argue, pace Kant’s ‘miserable comforters’ that if, as they claimed, war is extra-judicial, then:

all our institutions, our traditions and our laws are infected with violence and radically vitiated; there follows something awful to believe: that all power is tyranny, all property usurpation and that society is to be reconstructed from top to bottom. Not even tacit consent, proscription or ulterior conventions could redeem such an anomaly … one does not build right on its own negation.​[56]​

It is only by giving war this moral ontology that it is possible for Proudhon to demonstrate the systems of justice that have emerged from the antagonism between force and law or reason and emotion, the passions and principles. If war is simple brute materiality, then neither it nor its results can be seen to be Just. The next question is, how are we supposed to move out of this period of global war?


War and Social Learning

Simply put, for Proudhon the brute materiality of war has consistently eroded human faith in the ideals by which it is justified. Central to this is the argument that there is a ‘permanent contradiction … between the theory of the right of force and its application’. The nadir of the collective application of the right of force is in war. But, like force, ‘[s]ublime and saintly in its idea, war is horrible in its execution; while its theory elevates man, its practice dishonours him’.​[57]​

He argues that in war, the realities of the situation demand that soldiers, civilians or societies disregard ideals in the name of an assumed necessity, or they become forced to re-evaluate their pre-war ideals, the fought-for ends of the conflict, given the carnage it causes. The rise of a particular form of science was what worried Proudhon most. He put no great stock in rational utilitarianism, then epitomised by Jomini’s the new science of strategy,​[58]​ and lamented the probability that when the rationalist and amoral dogma of interests and the principles of virtu or élan come into conflict, interests will ‘trample all morality and all ideals underfoot’. Seeing this process as largely inevitable, Proudhon prayed that we might be protected ‘from the introduction of utilitarianism in war as much as in morality’.​[59]​ God wasn’t listening, and the industrialisation of warfare merely exacerbated this situation. Writing in the aftermath of the unprecedented carnage caused by artillery during the Crimean War and the Lombardy campaigns, and the immediacy of the conflict in the daily press, he noted,

When weapons become such that numbers and discipline, or even courage mean next to nothing in war, bid adieu to majority rule, adieu to universal suffrage, adieu to empire, adieu to republic, in fact adieu to all forms of government. Power will rest with the most villainous.​[60]​

It ought to be recognised that modern artillery, rifling, the revolver, and other such cutting-edge instruments of war at Proudhon’s time, had begun to reduce war to what he called ‘reciprocal slaughtergrounds’,​[61]​ and he argued that ‘the perfectibility of weapons renders the reconciliation of peoples impossible’.​[62]​ He argued that those with the ‘largest machines and greatest capital’ will invariably win and the revolutionary élan of war would (and did) eventually vanish.​[63]​

Proudhon suggested that duelling provides a good analogy for this parallel development of warfare and of justice. The basic point is that duelling is based on equality of risk and is a demonstration of strength and virtue observed throughout the ages where the victor is deemed the right and just. Warfare, on the other hand, has moved progressively from hand-to-hand combat, where valour was at a premium, to distance killing, and the element of individual valour has been progressively lost. War no longer provides a means for realising justice, because rational utility and interest have erased its passionate moral content – its élan.​[64]​

As such, Proudhon’s ideas are historically quite significant. John Muller argues that in ‘the nineteenth century the idea that war [and duelling] was a truly repulsive exercise began to gain truly widespread acceptance for the first time in the history of Western civilization’.​[65]​ Proudhon was therefore situated at a decisive juncture in modern history where French revolutionary élan was a driving moral force for much of society and yet modern artillery and rifling were rendering it pointless. As the French were soon to discover, moral fortitude or the promises of political revolution no longer won wars in the way that it did less than a generation earlier. When they were faced by the latest Prussian artillery in 1870 the then (conventionally considered) superior French were routed – signalling the first major shift in the European balance of power for nearly a century.


The Balance of Power

This transformation in the European balance of power arguably began in the late 1850s when Napoleon III stated, with some hyperbole, that the peace treaties that emerged from the 1815 Congress of Vienna and marked the end of the Revolutionary Wars had ‘ceased to exist’. He implied that the days of French imperial ambition had re-begun and that the restrictions imposed upon her by the allied powers in 1815 were unacceptable. Louis Napoleon’s words understandably sparked panic and outrage across Europe, attendant, as they were, on his expeditions in Mexico and Italy.

However, at that time the bellicose and militarist left saw 1815 near-unanimously as the entrenchment of a reactionary and counter-revolutionary post-war order, and so when Proudhon came out in support of the treaties he was denounced as a counter-revolutionary, and this despite his denouncing Louis Napoleon as a fool. His thoughts deserve revisiting because of what they tell us about how Proudhon understood international order and justice. What we find is that arguing in favour of retaining the 1815 treaties was totally in keeping with his thinking about world politics.

In keeping with his sociological metaphysics, Proudhon argues that ‘for there to be a veritable law of nations, there must be in the moral being which we call the nation, an order of relations which one cannot find in the simple citizen’.​[66]​ He argued that the people saw their states to be the moral incarnation of their collective will, and law and suffrage (for what it was worth) consecrated states as such. The year 1815 was momentous for it represented the beginning of the end of near-universal monarchical rule in Europe and the birth of the ‘age of constitutions’ backed by considerable popular support. The people, fighting for more than just bread, had died for their right to be consulted on the future of Europe, and as Bobbitt argues, public opinion did in fact sway the outcomes of the Congress of Vienna.​[67]​

What Proudhon argued was that in the aftermath of the Revolutionary Wars most of Europe had adopted constitutional government as the new legitimate form of political rule for the first time in history. This reflected and coded the new constellations of collective forces within society, and with the advancement of science, emancipation and suffrage there developed innovative new modes of social organisation. The people (admittedly mostly rich men) were now the new power-sharers, and considered themselves citizens and co-nationals for the first time in history. The French Revolution had unleashed forces which radically transformed the domestic and international balance of power between and within European states. The 1815 treaties therefore represented a balance of ambitions between the forces of change and those of reaction – both of whom believed their causes and their means to be just, but neither of which was preponderant, as the following 20 years of French revolutions would show. The process was not new, but the outcomes were.

But if, as Napoleon had claimed, the treaties of 1815 no longer ‘existed’, if it were possible to vaporise treaties unilaterally, Proudhon argued that ‘there is no longer any European public law’, no ‘guarantees’ of public order, and Europe is again in a state of war. There would be no more ‘legal frontiers’, the integrity of nationalities would be under question again, and nothing but force would reign.​[68]​ In fact, he argues, it would be counter revolutionary to side with Napoleon III and eradicate the treaties, because most European rulers were co-opting nationalist and socialist movements for their own ends.​[69]​ What Proudhon asks us to accept is that the new world order, consecrated by the 1815 peace treaties, was tacitly acceptable to the great powers and the people, and had settled European international politics for 40 years (before the Crimean War), and they had also revolutionised the internal make-up of states. There is thus, he argued,

solidarity between the principle of international equilibrium and the principle of constitutions, and that les faits accomplis of the last fifty years, because of this solidarity, are those which today we cannot touch without making society regress beyond the treaty of Westphalia, to that terrible right of force, of which the Thirty-Years war was one of its most shocking applications.​[70]​

We can see that Proudhon clearly saw international politics as politically and historically prior to domestic politics, its structural shell, because he understood the role of force in constituting social order. But the contradiction which gave Proudhon most concern arose when Rousseau’s words were taken literally, and states, now nation-states for the first time, began to conceive of, or sought to create themselves as ‘one and indivisible’ and began to take Rousseauean-inspired Jacobin nationalism quite literally as gospel. These new and fallacious nation-states actively pursued policies designed to make themselves the very things they protested to be, when in reality they were no more ‘one and indivisible’ than Europe itself. Beginning in earnest with the French Revolution, this was, of course, the reformulation of modes of domination in society that had been going on for millennia. But with social control and the technologies of death radically modernised, the task of crushing internal divisions became much easier, and the ideology used to justify it easier to propagate and disseminate.

In direct opposition to this statism, Proudhon recognised that it was only by affirming difference and unity vis-à-vis other states (indeed within social relationships as such), that it became possible to balance at all, and that this principle was progressive since immanent equilibrium is the temporary manifestation of justice. As a socialist, Proudhon argued that the next stage of revolution was to redress the situation in which 1815 had left Europe: namely to combat against the internal and external belligerence of states by redressing the economic imbalances which they create within society.


Anarchy, Anarchism and the Future World Order

For Proudhon domestic and international society is without transcendental foundation. But while we know that the answers to the question of internal and external anarchy for most modern states and their ideologues were ‘the messianic visions and many attempts to form universal monarchies or republics’,​[71]​ for Proudhon it was anarchism. This anarchism, or ‘agro-industrial federalism’ as he came to call it, was the inevitable conclusion of his theory of social justice.

Being among the first and most influential socialists of his time Proudhon recognised that the economy could not be entrusted to capital, which imposes its own disciplining forces on society derived from the control of labour and the power derived from the appropriation of productive surplus.​[72]​ Moreover, Proudhon argued that the state, a largely destructive institution with no productive capacity of its own, was no less parasitical upon society than capitalists. He argued that together capital and the state produce ‘ruptures in the economic equilibrium’​[73]​ which routinely cause famine, social conflict and ultimately the resource wars to solve them. This demands that the state generate its military capacity to protect its internal monopoly on resources against internal and external rivals. Taking this theory seriously enough to open his book with it, Berghahn has argued that Proudhon was the first to develop a coherent theory of militarism as state control of the economy for military purposes.​[74]​ As such, La Guerre et la Paix must surely stand as one of the first economic histories of warfare and of state development in history.

It is therefore little wonder that Proudhon saw socialist political economy, particularly his theory of mutualism, as the best, lasting remedy for the rupture in the economic equilibrium and thus a lasting end to war. He defined mutualism as follows:

individual liberty must be respected; a balance of values and services must be ensured; the benefits of capital must be reciprocal; the cessation of the alienation of collective forces [must be ensured]; government must be established on the democratisation of industrial groups, the source of collective force, that is to say that states should be reformed according to the law of their internal balancing; the clergy must be removed from providing primary education; professional (practical) education must be organised; public oversight must be assured.​[75]​

The key was the socialisation of title among the individuals which comprise ‘natural groups’ in order to return political and economic force to the people.​[76]​ Proudhon argued that this re-enfranchisement would transform our natural destructive urges and regulate our martial impulses through the strictures of the industrial domain. He saw economic enfranchisement as central to realising our own passionate and creative potential in the fullest and most benign way.

This economic plan has a political corollary. Towns, industries, workshops and regions – all natural groups – ought to reclaim their autonomy and then federate. Proudhon argued for a politico-economic mutualist contract. He recognised that federalism is ‘liberal par excellence’ but the point is that the contract must be real as opposed to ‘a legal fiction, imagined as an alternative to divine right, paternal authority, or social necessity, in explaining the origins of the state and relations between government and individual’.​[77]​ Proudhon was quick to point out the confusion in modern political theory between the metaphysical fiction of Social Contract theory and the reality of militarism and force.

Proudhon’s mutualist contract assumes asymmetric abilities and powers between societies, groups and individuals and, by contrast with traditional distributive or legal conceptions of justice, forms the basis of a synallagmatic or commutative conception of justice. The latter is conceived to govern exchange in anarchy, structured according to socialised title, and a federated, bottom-up form of governance.​[78]​

For Proudhon, all ‘natural groups’, consecrated morally, politically and economically by the act of association, and emerging from the natural processes of history, should, where necessary, obligate themselves to one another by contract according to the specific needs and functions of the group and its place and role in society.​[79]​ Developing the emerging norms of social democracy and individual sovereignty, Proudhon argued that each natural group must be democratically constituted so as to truly approximate Rousseau’s ideal of coming to agreement ‘under an Oak tree’.​[80]​ The principle of rule ought to be bottom-up rather than top-down, with important decisions made at the level likely to be most affected by them, or, in modern parlance, via the principle of subsidiary.​[81]​ Rather than elect individuals who decide for us how we should be represented, natural groups ought to send recallable delegates who would represent their interests in relevant forums. Society would thus become the context for the realisation of individual and social goals rather than being the object of minority control.

Proudhon referred to the Swiss confederation as a model for the rest of the world. He argued that similar federated political communities emerging out of a mutualist economy would remove the impulse to wage aggressive war for minority material ends, while retaining the potential of defensive wars because of mutual interest in maintaining a system that provided mutual benefit. Contractual society and federated political units are also flexible enough to allow peaceful change, ought to guarantee the right to secession, and should be strong enough to ensure stability because they represent the asymmetric powers of society. Of course, it is also clear that in this system moral and legal ties would be as plural as the associations individuals become directly involved in – a new form of medievalism for example.​[82]​ Thus the rupture in the economic equilibrium and the problems of statism had a single solution – self-governance (autogestion), cooperation and productive conflict, and a loose ‘principle of federation’.






This paper has sought to provide a contextualised synopsis of Proudhon’s International Political Theory. I have focused on the three core elements of his thinking: justice, war and its relationship to order, and anarchy. It is ‘grand theory’ to say the least, but the fact is, because it is so ambitious and thought-provoking because it tries to link so many currently disparate themes, ideas and theories into a coherent whole, and because it is such an important historical milestone in the discipline of IR, it is surely a lost mine of theoretical and historical insight for contemporary scholars. We can see that Proudhon unites law with force, reason with our passions, the state with capital, and history with philosophy. It cuts across obvious twentieth-century Realist and Idealist themes and motifs and engages with debates that are only possible today because of the change in the make-up and purpose of IR as an academic discipline. Proudhon’s international political theory is above all historical and sociological in method, normative and critical in its political philosophy, socialist in its economics and would contribute a significant pre-disciplinary approach to contemporary post-disciplinary thinking. It is also my hope that the paper raises sufficiently important questions about Proudhon’s work to engage contemporary IR theorists in a debate about both the absence of anarchism in IR and Proudhon’s potential contribution to it.

This might fruitfully be done from within contemporary Critical Theory and a brief discussion of this should illustrate how Proudhon’s ideas might be able to contribute to contemporary IR theory. I have argued that there are three main components to Proudhon’s international political theory. The first is a theory of justice as immanent equilibrium. This focus on the normative, after the dominance of Structural Realism in IR theory, contributes a fresh new sociological approach to moral discourse in IR and one that might contribute to our current understandings of normative change in the international realm. Secondly, Proudhon’s theory of the right of force might, with qualification, act as a natural check to any depoliticised conceptions of the international and the legal in world politics. It might also assist in the historicising of world politics by showing the real human endeavour – namely militarism – that has gone into fashioning the status quo. Proudhon’s writings might also contribute to our understanding of the relationship between the individual and international society, between material and ideational forces, and between force, psychology and law. His attempt to understand the relationship between morality and force might also contribute to the development of a more sophisticated account of the relative endurance of normative systems in international relations.

Echoed later in Critical Theory’s debunking of the hubris of twentieth-century positivism, Proudhon argued that the principle of pluralism would ensure the open development of our rational capacities and the openness of society as such, both of which are central to the productive conflict, engendered by difference, which is the basis of social change and the emergence and development of new norms of justice and equitable social orders. It is precisely because of their dogmatism that Proudhon rejected offers of collaboration from Marx and Comte, both of whom sought out Proudhon’s popularity and status in the French labour movement to advance their own projects.​[86]​ In fact, tellingly for the evolution of European social theory, five years after Proudhon’s death, Marx wrote to Engels about the impending Prussian war with France and said:

The French need a thrashing. If the Prussians win, then the centralisation of the State power will help the centralization of the German working-class. German preponderance, moreover, will shift the centre of gravity of the working-class movement of Western Europe from France to Germany … [which would mean] the preponderance of our theory over those of Proudhon, etc.​[87]​






Research Student, Department of Politics, International Relations and European Studies, Loughborough University. 












^1	 * I would like to thank Andreas Antoniades, Dave Berry, Oliver Daddow, Ana Juncos, Ruth Kinna, Scott Turner, Steven Vincent, two anonymous reviewers and participants at numerous conference panels and research seminars for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 1 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Property? or, an Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government, trans. Donald R. Kelley and Bonnie G. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 209.
^2	 2 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, La Guerre et La Paix, recherches sur la principe et la constitution du droit des gens, (Paris: Editions Tops, 1998), vol. II, 147.
^3	 3 See, for example, David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Howard Williams, International Relations and the Limits of Political Theory (London: Macmillan, 1996). ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Boucher</Author><Year>1998</Year><RecNum>372</RecNum><record><rec-number>372</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Boucher, David</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present</title></titles><dates><year>1998</year></dates><pub-location>Oxford</pub-location><publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Tuck</Author><Year>2001</Year><RecNum>566</RecNum><record><rec-number>566</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Tuck, Richard</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant</title></titles><dates><year>2001</year></dates><pub-location>Oxford</pub-location><publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Williams</Author><Year>1996</Year><RecNum>106</RecNum><record><rec-number>106</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Williams, Howard</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>International Relations and the Limits of Political Theory</title><short-title>International Relations</short-title></titles><dates><year>1996</year></dates><pub-location>London</pub-location><publisher>Macmillan</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>
^4	 4 See, for example, Richard K. Ashley, ‘Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique’, Millennium 17, no. 2 (1988): 227–62; Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of a Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity, 1998); R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
^5	 5 Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998); Ole Wæver, ‘The Sociology of a Not so International Discipline’, International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 687–727.
^6	 6 Andrew Linklater, ‘The Achievements of Critical Theory’, in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. K. Booth, S. Smith and M. Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Linklater</Author><Year>1996</Year><RecNum>164</RecNum><record><rec-number>164</rec-number><ref-type name="Book Section">5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Linklater, Andrew</author></authors><secondary-authors><author>Booth, K</author><author>Smith, S</author><author>Zalewski, M</author></secondary-authors></contributors><titles><title>The Achievements of Critical Theory</title><secondary-title>International Theory: Positivism and Beyond</secondary-title></titles><pages>279-297</pages><dates><year>1996</year></dates><pub-location>Cambridge</pub-location><publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>
^7	 7 See, for example, Colin Creighton and Martin Shaw, The Sociology of War and Peace (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); Andrew Linklater, ‘Norbert Elias, The “Civilizing Process” and the Sociology of International Relations’, International Politics 41 (2004): 3–35; Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
^8	 8 This paper will not traverse Proudhon’s biography in any way. For this see Robert L. Hoffman, Revolutionary Justice: The Social and Political Theory of P.-J. Proudhon (London: University of Illinois Press, 1972); K. Steven Vincent, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); George Woodcock, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: A Biography (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956).
^9	 9 P.-J. Proudhon, De la Justice dans la Révolution et dans l'Église: Études de philosophie pratique (Paris: Fayard, 1988–1990).
^10	 10 These are Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Du Principe Fédératif et de la Nécessité de reconstituer le parti de la révolution. (includes) Si Les Traités de 1815 ont Cessé d’Exister (Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1863); Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, France et Rhin, Oeuvres Posthumes de P. J. Proudhon (Paris: A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven et Companie, 1868); Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, La Fédération et l’Unité en Italie (Paris: E. Dentu, 1862); Proudhon, La Guerre et La Paix, 2 vols; Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Nouvelles Observations sur l’Unité Italienne (Paris: E. Dentu, 1865). ‘La Pologne’ (1863) extends to over 900 pages and remains unpublished. Of his extensive writings on international politics, only the first half of Du Principe Fédératif has been translated into English.
^11	 11 Hervé Trinquier ‘Introduction’, in Proudhon, La Guerre et La Paix, 11.
^12	 12 Madeleine Amoudruz, Proudhon et l’Europe: Les Ideés de Proudhon en Politique Étrangère (Paris: Éditions Domat Montchrestien, 1945), 151.
^13	 13 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 49.
^14	 14 E. H. Carr, ‘Proudhon: The Robinson Crusoe of Socialism’, in Studies in Revolution, ed. E. H. Carr (London: Macmillan, 1950), 38–55. This essay was first published in the Times Literary Supplement. Given Orwell’s evaluation of Carr as an ‘appeaser’ of Stalin, Carr’s negative view of the anarchists is unsurprising.
^15	 15 Cited in Aaron Noland, ‘Proudhon’s Sociology of War’, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 29, no. 3 (1970): 291.
^16	 16 Daniel Pick, War Machine: The Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
^17	 17 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 600–10. Since this is also the subject of this paper I will not discuss Aron’s use of Proudhon here. Also, Proudhon’s influence on two generations of French sociology has been widely discussed. See, for example, Pierre Ansart, ‘Proudhon à travers le temps’, L’Homme et Société 123–124 (1997): 17–24; Édouard Berth, ‘Proudhon en Sorbonne’, L’Indepéndence, no. 27 (1912): 122–40; Joshua M. Humphreys, ‘Durkheimian Sociology and 20th-Century Politics: The Case of Célestin Bouglé’, History of the Human Sciences 12, no. 3 (1999): 117–38.
^18	 18 Alan Ritter, The Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 24.
^19	 19 Amoudruz, Proudhon et l’Europe, 20, 78.
^20	 20 Noland, ‘Proudhon’s Sociology of War’: 289–304.
^21	 21 The exception that proves the rule is, F. Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations (London: Sage, 1977), 146–9.
^22	 22 Methodologically, this paper follows the contextualist approach of Quentin Skinner. It is impossible to do justice to his work in a footnote; however, Skinner’s principal aim was to insist that only through according dominant role to intellectual context can we understand the ideas and intentions of past political theorists. It is for this reason that I largely avoid using contemporary theory to give meaning to the past. See, for example, Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas (1969)’, in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), 29–67.
^23	 23 It is impossible to engage with all the critiques of Proudhon’s life, ideas and legacy here. For a good debunking of the classical myths surrounding Proudhon’s political theory, see Ritter, The Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 3–23.
^24	 24 Proudhon, De la Justice, 177.
^25	 25 Charles Fourier, Theory of the Four Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
^26	 26 Robert Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 133, cf. Immanuel Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’, in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 45.
^27	 27 Auguste Comte, ‘Plan of the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganisation of Society’, in Comte: Early Political Writings, ed. H. S. Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 47–144; Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal History’, 41–53; Jean-Jaques Rousseau, ‘Of the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right’, in Rousseau: The Social Contract and other Later Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 39–152.
^28	 28 On Kant’s influence on Proudhon, and a critique of the myth of Proudhon’s Hegelianism, see, for example, Henri De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist: A Study of Proudhon, trans. R. E. Scantlebury (London: Sheed and Ward, 1948). On Comte’s ‘lavish’ praise for Kant’s ‘Idea of a Universal History’ see Mary Pickering, August Comte: An Intellectual Biography, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 296–301, 289–96. On Rousseau’s influence on Kant see, for example, Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963).
^29	 29 Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix, 136.
^30	 30 Proudhon, De la Justice, 637.
^31	 31 This is the basis of an anarchist refusal of state punishment that sees social moral sanction as preferable. See Alan Ritter, ‘Goodwin, Proudhon and the Anarchist Justification of Punishment’, Political Theory 3, no. 1 (1975): 69–87.
^32	 32 Stewart Edwards (ed.), Selected Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (London: Macmillan, 1969), 249. For an excellent analysis of Proudhon’s understanding of norms see, Sophie Chambost, Proudhon et la Norm: Pensé juridique d’un anarchiste (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2004).
^33	 33 Aaron Noland, ‘History and Humanity: The Proudhonian Vision’, in The Uses of History: Essays in Intellectual and Social History, ed. Hayden White (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968), 59–105.
^34	 34 Cited in De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, 144.
^35	 35 Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix, 64.
^36	 36 Ibid., 63.
^37	 37 Cited in Vincent, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 218.
^38	 38 Edwards (ed.), Selected Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 232.
^39	 39 Ibid., 232–3.
^40	 40 Noland, ‘History and Humanity’, 69.
^41	 41 Frank E. Manuel, The Prophets of Paris: Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Comte (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 281.
^42	 42 Proudhon’s anti-feminism is well documented, and feminist critiques of Proudhon’s thought pinpoint a first-order contradiction in his ideas. Unfortunately this cannot be given the attention it deserves here. See, for example, Sharif Gemie ‘Anarchism and Feminism: A Historical Survey’, Women’s History Review 5, no. 3 (1996): 417–44.
^43	 43 Constance Margaret Hall, The Sociology of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 1809–1865 (New York: Philosophical Library, 1971), 32. cf. Celestin Bouglé, La Sociologie de Proudhon (Paris: Armand Colin, 1911). Proudhon’s influence on French sociology is discussed in note 17 above.
^44	 44 Proudhon’s debt to Comte is discussed in detail in Pierre Haubtmann, La Philosophie Sociale de P.-J. Proudhon (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1980).
^45	 45 Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix, 44; cf. Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity, trans. Edward Spencer Beesly et al. (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), vol. III, 44–58.
^46	 46 Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix, 40. Proudhon’s use of the word ‘divine’ here led some to read this work as a theocratic apology for war. In fact Proudhon argues that like the origin of the species, war remains a divine fact until it is penetrated by science. Ibid., 38.
^47	 47 Ibid., 48 (emphasis added).
^48	 48 Ibid., 139.
^49	 49 Ibid., 135–43.
^50	 50 Ibid., 189 (emphasis added).
^51	 51 Ibid., 143.
^52	 52 Ibid., 113–16.
^53	 53 Ibid., 135.
^54	 54 Ibid., 144.
^55	 55 Ibid., 168.
^56	 56 Ibid., 102. For Proudhon’s engagement with Kant’s ‘sorry comforters’ see Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix, 86–202.
^57	 57 Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix, 202.
^58	 58 Ibid., 237-40. cf. Michael Howard, ‘Jomini and the Classical Tradition in Military Thought’, in The Theory and Practice of War: Essays Presented to Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, ed. Michael Howard (London: Cassell, 1965).
^59	 59 Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix, 289.
^60	 60 Ibid., 257.
^61	 61 Ibid., 282.
^62	 62 Ibid., 283.
^63	 63 Ibid., 284.
^64	 64 Ibid., 254.
^65	 65 John Muller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (London: Basic Books, 1990), 220.
^66	 66 Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix, 164.
^67	 67 Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 547.
^68	 68 Proudhon, Du Principe Fédératif, 243–4. 
^69	 69 Proudhon, La Fédération et l’Unité en Italie.
^70	 70 Proudhon, Du Principe Fédératif, 260.
^71	 71 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, The Principle of Federation and the Need to Reconstitute the Party of the Revolution, trans. Richard Vernon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 51.
^72	 72 See Proudhon, What is Property? On the Proudhonist origins of Marx’s theory of surplus value see Thierry Menuelle, Marx, lecteur de Proudhon (Paris: Presses E.H.E.S.S., 1993).
^73	 73 Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix, vol. II., 16. cf. Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal History’, 44; Rousseau, ‘The Social Contract’, 46.
^74	 74 Volker R. Berghahn, Militarism: The History of an Intellectual Debate 1861–1971 (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1981).
^75	 75 Proudhon, De la Justice, 1096; cf. Proudhon, The Principle of Federation, 49.
^76	 76 cf. Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, The Political Economy of Participatory Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
^77	 77 Proudhon, The Principle of Federation, 72–3. cf. Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organised Crime’, in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-91.
^78	 78 Yves Simon, ‘A Note on Proudhon’s Federalism’, in Federalism as Grand Design: Political Philosophers and the Federal Principle, ed. Daniel J. Elazar (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987), 228.
^79	 79 cf. David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London: Martin Robertson, 1975).
^80	 80 Aaron Noland, ‘Proudhon and Rousseau’, Journal of the History of Ideas 28, no. 1 (1967): 33–54.
^81	 81 cf. Andreas Föllesdal, ‘Survey Article: Subsidiarity’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 6, no. 2 (1998): 190–218.
^82	 82 cf. Jörg Friedrichs, ‘The Meaning of New Medievalism’, European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 4 (2001): 475–502.
^83	 83 Proudhon, The Principle of Federation, 53. ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Proudhon</Author><Year>1979</Year><RecNum>95</RecNum><Pages>53</Pages><record><rec-number>95</rec-number><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph</author></authors><subsidiary-authors><author>Richard Vernon</author></subsidiary-authors></contributors><titles><title>The Principle of Federation and the Need to Reconstitute the Party of the Revolution</title><short-title>The Principle of Federation</short-title></titles><dates><year>1979</year></dates><pub-location>Toronto</pub-location><publisher>University of Toronto Press</publisher><orig-pub>1863</orig-pub><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>
^84	 84 On Proudhon’s potential to contribute to regionalist and nationalist debates in Europe, see Ioan Bowen Rees, ‘Ffedraliaeth Proudhon ac Ewrop Heddiw’, in Ioan Bowen Rees, Cymuned a Chenedl: ysgrifau ar ymreolaeth (Llandysul: Gomer, 1993): 145–83; Raimondo Cagiano de Azevedo and Luca Blasi ‘Fédéralisme et Europe des Regions’, in, Quel au-delà Pour la Nation: Mondialisme, Internationalism, Fédéralisme? Actes du Colloque de la Société P-J Proudhon, ed. Pierre Ansart et al. (Paris, Publications E.H.E.S.S, 1999), 51–9.
^85	 85 A similar and influential contemporary statement of this formulation is David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1995).
^86	 86 On Proudhon’s rejection of offers of collaboration from Marx, see, for example, Woodcock, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: A Biography, 87–93. The only discussion of a rejection of the same from Comte is in Haubtmann, La Philosophie Sociale de P.-J. Proudhon, 183–96.
^87	 87 Cited in John Hampden Jackson, Marx, Proudhon and European Socialism (London: English Universities Press, 1957), 140.
